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The representation of trait descriptions in memory depends not only on the 
properties of this information (e.g., whether it is consistent) but also on the 
operations performed on it (e.g., whether it has been integrated). If a set of traits 
merely has to be comprehended without being integrated (called a discrere judg- 
ment), then an inconsistent set is processed just as readily as a consistent one. 
However, if integration is required, that is, a coherent impression must be formed 
(called an integrative judgmenr), consistent trait descriptions are processed more 
rapidly than inconsistent ones. The effect of such differences in processing on 
the representation was shown in recognition memory performance: First, fol- 
lowing integrative judgment a trait description was more accessible than following 
a discrete judgment. Second, under integrative judgment, memory for a consistent 
trait description was no greater than that for an inconsistent description, whereas 
under discrete judgment, memory for the former was superior to that for the 
latter. This suggests that when an impression is formed, namely, under integrative 
judgment, the traits describing a person are associated with each other via prior 
knowledge, and thus are represented as a unified structure; otherwise each trait 
is stored as a separate piece of information. 
The present study is concerned with two related issues in opinion 
formation: If there is an inconsistency between arguments in a message 
(i) when is the inconsistency resolved and (ii) how does the resolution 
of the inconsistency affect the representation of this information in mem- 
ory? Earlier (Burnstein & Schul, 1982) we described several basic 
operations performed during opinion formation, namely, recognition (in- 
itial encoding), comprehension (elaborative encoding), unification of the 
encoded information (integration), and finally, an evaluation in light of 
this integrated knowledge (decision). In the course of this analysis it was 
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suggested that a consistency check would not be performed automatically 
every time two or more arguments are processed. Rather, it should come 
into play when this information has to be integrated. ’ At this point in 
opinion formation the arguments have to be interpreted in unified fashion 
and inconsistencies must somehow be resolved. A consistency check, 
therefore, is only one of several distinct operations performed between 
the initial encoding and the decision. If this is the case, differences in 
consistency should have pronounced effects at those points in opinion 
formation that involve integration but little or no effects otherwise. 
To underline the difference between opinion formation processes that 
include integration from those that do not, let us call the former an 
integrative judgment, and the latter, a discrete judgment. Our experi- 
ment, therefore, examines (i) the processing of consistent and incon- 
sistent trait descriptions and (ii) the representation of these descriptions 
in memory following either discrete judgment or integrative judgment. 
Recall that when trait descriptions are inconsistent an integrative judg- 
ment requires that the inconsistencies be resolved. This means that a 
schema must be found that provides a sensible, coherent interpretation 
of what, at first glance, seems to be incompatible traits. By definition 
such a schema is not the typical or dominant one in this context- 
otherwise the description would have at once been perceived as con- 
sistent-and thus, it is relatively inaccessible (Holmes, 1979; Smith, 
Shoben, & Rips, 1974). As a result, an integrative judgment based on 
inconsistent trait information ought to take longer than one based on 
consistent trait information. 
Discrete judgments encode each piece of information separately; they 
are typically performed in assessing frequency (e.g., “Did the group 
have more than three members named Igor?“), co-occurrence (e.g., “Did 
the group have both male and female members?“), or a common feature 
(e.g., “Were the group members all bald?“). Such operations do not call 
for an integrating schema; instead they can be carried out simply by 
making a separate estimate for each piece of information and keeping 
a tally of the results. Hence, there is no need either to check the infor- 
mation for inconsistencies or to reconcile those that happen to be de- 
tected. It follows, then, that the time needed to make a discrete judgment 
should be invariant with the consistency of the trait description. 
According to our analysis, the representation of trait information will 
also differ as a function of the encoding operation. There is reasonably 
good evidence for this from studies demonstrating that the associative 
links between trait descriptions depend on the processing schema. Lord 
’ It is worth noting here that we use the term “integrated” to refer to a set of cognitive 
operations that serve to link two or more representations in a consistent fashion. This is 
somewhat different from the use of the term in research stemming from Information 
Integration Theory (Anderson, 1974). 
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(1980), for example, found that encoding information in the context of 
a “self” schema produces a more elaborated trace than encoding the 
same information in a different (i.e., nonself) context, such as a “Walter 
Cronkite” schema (see also Markus, 1980; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 
1977; for comparable encoding effects in respect to general semantic 
information see Craik & Tulving, 1975). Hartwick (1979) even suggested 
that different links are activated when different encoding structures are 
employed because subjects evidenced more affective associations fol- 
lowing instructions to form an opinion than following instructions to 
memorize. 
In the present study, under integrative judgment, traits are encoded 
within a single schema, namely, they are associatively linked to each 
other via schematic knowledge. Under discrete judgments, however, 
traits tend to be encoded separately with few associative links. Since 
retrieval is an increasing function of the degree of association among the 
to-be-retrieved elements as well as the degree of associations between 
the latter and established knowledge (cf. Craik & Tulving. 1975; Mandler, 
1979), memory following integrative judgment should be superior to that 
following discrete judgment. In addition, inconsistencies are presumed 
to be reconciled during integration. If so, then whether the trait descrip- 
tions were originally consistent or inconsistent should not affect their 
accessibility once they have been integrated. Retrieval, thus, should be 
invariant with the consistency of the description under integrative judg- 
ment. Generally speaking, however, consistent descriptions are inher- 
ently more configurable and, thus, more readily retrievable than incon- 
sistent ones (e.g., Bower, Clark, Lesgold, & Winzenz, 1969; Rothbart, 
Evans, & Fulero, 1979). Recall that a discrete judgment is assumed to 
preserve the inconsistencies in a trait description. As a consequence, 
under discrete judgment consistent descriptions should be retrieved more 
readily than inconsistent ones. 
Subjects 
METHOD 
Forty students from the University of Michigan introductory psychology classes served 
as subjects to satisfy a course requirement. They were assigned randomly to one of the 
two judgment conditions with the constraint that there be an equal number per condition. 
Apparatus 
Subjects were seated in individual booths, equipped with a 12 in. monitor, two movable 
buttons labeled “old” and “new,” and a six-button response box (buttons labeled from 
1 to 6). The “old” button was moved to the subject’s dominant hand. Presentation of the 
stimuli was controlled by a PDP-It computer system with responses and reaction times 
recorded under the program control. 
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Procedure 
Prior to the experiment proper, subjects underwent practice training in which they 
became familiar with the buttons, the screen, and the experimental procedure. Numbers 
were used as stimuli during this session. 
Judgmental phase. The same eight sets of three traits from Anderson (1968) were 
presented to each subject in a different random order. The four consistent sets contained 
traits with similar affective values. The positive set had a mean “likability” value of 503 
and the negative set a mean of 99, with a maximum within-set difference of 100 on a 600- 
point scale. The four inconsistent sets contained traits with different affective values. Their 
mean “likability” value was 286. with a minimum within-set difference of 300 points on 
this scale.’ In the integrative judgment condition subjects indicated that their opinion of 
a person described by each set on a scale ranging from (1) very unfavorable to (6) very 
favorable. In the discrete judgment condition subjects indicated whether the majority of 
the traits in each set could describe a human being only or nonhumans as well, on a scale 
ranging from “human only” (1) to “humans and nonhumans as well” (6). 
Refrievnl phase. Following the judgmental phase, subjects were presented with 64 probes 
(eight probes for each original set). Half of these probes were “old” (contained only traits 
that appeared in the same set during the judgmental phase), and the remaining were “new” 
(contained at least one trait that did not appear during the judgmental phase at all). 
Specifically, let (A B C) denote an original set (from the judgmental phase), and N denote 
a trait that did not appear in that phase. The “old” recognition probes were (A B). 
(A C), (B C), and (A B C). The “new” probes were chosen from the combinations 
(A N), (B N), (N B). (N Cl, (A B N), (A N C), and (N C B). 
For each original set two “new” probes contained only two traits, and the remaining 
two contained three traits. In addition, for the consistent sets. two of the recognition 
probes contained a new trait that was evaluatively similar to the trait it replaced, and two 
“new” probes contained a new trait which was opposite in value. Probes were constructed 
so that each trait (old or new) was equally likely to be presented. Finally, the order in 
which probes were presented, as well as the particular “new” probes shown were deter- 
mined randomly for each individual subject. Subjects responded by pressing a button 
labeled with “old” if the probe was a part of an original set. and with “new” otherwise. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Judgmental Phase 
The two judgment conditions were assumed to differ in respect to 
whether or not trait descriptions had to be integrated and inconsistencies 
among these descriptions resolved. Hence, it was expected that an in- 
consistent trait description would hinder processing under integrative 
judgment but not under discrete judgment. For each subject we computed 
the median response time. This was done separately for consistent and 
inconsistent trait sets. The means of these scores under the two judgment 
conditions are presented in Fig. 1. A two way repeated measure ANOVA 
(judgment type x consistency) was performed on these medians. Overall, 
responses to consistent sets were faster than those to inconsistent ones 
’ Traits which are evaluatively inconsistent may still be semantically consistent (e.g.. 
Peabody, 1967). It has been demonstrated, however, that trait descriptions that are eval- 
uatively inconsistent are most often seen as descriptively inconsistent (De Boack. 1978; 
Peabody, 1978; Rosenberg & Olsham. 1970). 
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(F(1, 38) = 23.2, p < .Ol). The relationship between processing time 
and consistency, however, depended on the type of judgment, as indi- 
cated by the interaction between judgment type and consistency (F(1, 
38) = 24.9, p < .Ol). Thus, there was essentially no difference between 
the encoding of consistent and inconsistent trait descriptions under dis- 
crete judgment, but a large difference under integrative judgment (see 
Fig. I). Finally, there was no overall difference in response time between 
the two judgment conditions (F < 1). 
Retrieval Phase 
Recognition memory was sufficiently imperfect (mean proportion cor- 
rect = .71) to raise the possibility of a tradeoff between accuracy and 
speed of response (Pachella, 1974). Recognition times, therefore, were 
not analyzed. For each subject we computed a biased-free sensitivity 
score, A’, according to a procedure outlined in Grier (1971). This was 
done separately for consistent and inconsistent sets. These scores were 
then analyzed in a two-way repeated measures ANOVA (judgment type 
x consistency).3 The analysis indicated that subjects in the integrative 
judgment condition were more sensitive (i.e., performed more accurately 
in the recognition memory tasks after response biases were partialed out) 
than those in the discrete judgment condition (F(1, 38) = 30.6, p < .Ol). 
More importantly, consistency tended to have different effects depending 
on the type of judgment. This is suggested by the marginally reliable 
interaction between consistency and type of judgment (F(1, 38) = 3.19, 
p = .08): Planned comparisons (Winer, 1971, p. 551) revealed that, as 
hypothesized, subjects under integrative judgment condition seemed to 
display the same high degree of sensitivity to consistent as well as to 
inconsistent sets (t( 18) = .08), whereas those under discrete judgment 
did not. In the latter condition subjects were more sensitive to consistent 
than to the inconsistent information (t(18) = 3.79, p < .05). 
A comparison between recognition accuracy with similar and dissimilar 
“new” probes can shed additional light on the recognition process. In 
particular, if individuals store the gist of a trait description as indicated 
by its affective value, rather than an exact lexical representation, then 
it ought to be easier to reject affectively dissimilar “new” probes than 
affectively similar ones. To test this hypothesis we computed for each 
subject his or her accuracy rate (proportion correct) in recognizing the 
“new” probes to consistent sets. The computations were made sepa- 
rately for the similar and dissimilar probes. 
’ A three-way ANOVA (judgment x consistency x probe size) was conducted to 
explore whether the number of traits in the recognition probe affected recognition per- 
formance. Probes containing two traits produced greater sensitivity (I = .79) than those 
containing three traits (X = .74), F(1, 34) = 4.77, p c .05. However, none of the interactions 
involving probe size approached acceptable levels of significance, 
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FIG. I. Mean judgment time as a function of information consistency and processing 
task. (-) Discrete judgment: (..,.) integrative judgment. 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA (judgment type x probe type 
(similar vs dissimilar)) was performed on these accuracy rates. As in the 
A’ analysis, subjects under integrative judgment (44 = .80) were more 
accurate than those under discrete judgment (M = .55), F(1, 38) = 17.0, 
p < .Ol . More importantly, “new” probes that were affectively dissimilar 
to the description were rejected with greater accuracy (M = .73) than 
ones that were affectively similar (M = .62, F(1, 38) = 5.82, p < .05). 
The interaction between type of judgment and type of probe failed to 
reach significance (F < 1). 
These findings suggest that when all the traits in a set have the same 
affective significance, the person can distinguish between similar or dis- 
similar “new” probes and the representation of the trait information 
whether or not this information has been integrated. It would appear, 
then, that subjects rely heavily on the more general (affective) meaning 
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FIG. 2. Mean sensitivity (A’) as a function of information consistency and processing 
task. (-) Discrete judgment; (‘...) integrative judgment. 
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of the traits in order to perform the recognition task. This leads to the 
speculation that individuals either retain little of the lexical features of 
a trait or they store these separate from, and in less accessible form 
than, the affective features (cf. Anderson & Hubert, 1963). These results, 
however, are merely suggestive in this respect. A more definitive test 
would require systematic comparison of lexical and affective features, 
which was not possible in our study. Nevertheless, the same phenom- 
enon, retention of the gist rather than the lexical information in a message. 
has been documented repeatedly with prose (e.g., Bransford & Franks, 
1971). 
In related studies, Bower and Karlin (1974) and Winograd (1976) found 
better recognition memory for faces when the encoding task required 
integration of facial cues, that is, when the faces were interpreted within 
a relatively rich schema, than when integration was not required (see 
also Lord, 1980; Markus, 1980). In addition, of course, there are well- 
known experiments that obtain comparable memory effects for semantic 
information in general (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975) and for person de- 
scriptions in particular (e.g., Hastie & Kumar. 1979). These authors 
explained their results primarily in terms of levels of processing theory 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972). 
Although the above findings parallel our own, the level-of-processing 
explanation seems not to apply in the present case. Not only were there 
no overall differences in processing times between our two judgment 
conditions that could suggest a difference in processing depth, but more 
importantly, the interaction between consistency and judgment type in 
respect to processing time was the mirror image of the comparable in- 
teraction in respect to retrieval. That is to say, during the judgmental 
phase there was no difference due to consistency for the discrete judg- 
ment group, but a large difference for the integrative judgment group; 
whereas during retrieval there was a clear difference in sensitivity due 
to consistency for the former, but no difference for the latter. These 
effects, however, do follow from our assumption about the distinction 
between integrative judgments and discrete judgments, namely, that even 
though the two are comparable in respect to level of processing-both 
involve semantic elaboration of the trait descriptions-they differ in re- 
spect to whether or not the elaborated descriptions needed to be 
integrated. 
Our initial research on opinion formation and social judgment (Burn- 
stein & Schul. 1982) suggested that elaborative encoding and inte- 
gration were functionally distinct processes. This was based on their 
differential sensitivity to changes in the consistency of a trait description 
so that an inconsistent description was observed to have a larger impact 
on processing time during integration than during elaborative encoding. 
The present findings not only demonstrate this effect on processing in 
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a more clear-cut fashion, but more importantly, indicate that it extends 
also to the representation of a trait description. 
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